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The action of Nativ’s emissaries in the United States: 
a trigger for the American movement to aid Soviet Jews, 
1958-19741 
 
 
At the end of 1952, an office code-named “Nativ” –“Way” in Hebrew– was 
created in Tel-Aviv in the tightest secrecy. Also known as the Liaison Office or 
“Lishkat ha-Kesher”, this small structure was called upon to play a great role in 
the future of Israel. From the very beginning, its importance was signified by its 
direct accountability to the Prime Minister’s office. Its purpose was to secretly 
renew ties with Soviet Jews who had been totally cut off from the Zionist 
movement since the 1930s and who were victims of successive waves of 
repression, with the still very utopian hope to trigger their aliyah. Three 
coinciding decisive events led to the creation of Nativ. In 1951, immigration to 
Israel started diminishing seriously; an interest arose in the gigantic reservoir 
represented by the 3 million Jews living in the Soviet Union. Also, the revival of 
anti-Semitism in the years preceding Stalin’s demise called for solidarity with 
the diaspora in distress. Finally, as Jerusalem had decided to put an end to its 
non-alignment policy, it could voice its demand that Jews be allowed to 
emigrate, as stipulated by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a demand 
that had not been raised until then. However, the Hebrew State refused to sacrify 
its relation with Moscow for the sake of Soviet Jews. A clandestine body was 
                                                
1
 This article is based on several interviews with Israeli emissaries who worked for Nativ 
in the United States between 1958 and 1983. These interviews have been conducted 
between October 2002 and July 2003 in Israel and in the United States. I would like to 
thank the Centre de recherche français de Jérusalem whose support helped me carry out 
this project in the best possible conditions. So far, no academic study has been devoted to 
the activities of Nativ emissaries in the United States. Since the Archives of the Liaison 
office remain classified, interviews are the only way to understand their work abroad. 
List of Nativ emissaries who worked in New York : Uri Ra’anan (1958-1961), Benyamin 
Eliav (1960-1961), Meir Rosenne (1961-1966), Yoram Dinstein (1966-1970), Yehoshua 
Pratt (1970-1973), Yitzchak Rager (1973-1975), Haim Ber (1975-1978), Sara Frankel 
(1978-1983). Nativ emissaries in Washington: Nechemia Levanon (1965-1969), Nir 
Baruch (1969-1973), Jerry Shiran (1973- ?).  
Benyamin Eliav and Yitzchak Rager are deceased. Nir Baruch, Jerry Shiran and Haim 
Ber, whom I have been unable to locate, have not been interviewed. 
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designed to reconcile the interests of Israel as a State –to maintain its relations 
with the second superpower at any cost–, and its goal as the nation of the Jewish 
people –to help endangered Jews in the diaspora and make sure that immigration 
would not be halted. 
Upon the creation of the Israeli secret services out of the clandestine organs 
that had been operating during the British mandate, Shaul Avigur was assigned 
as leader of the sensitive task of creating Nativ. With this new mission, this very 
secretive man pursued his previous activity as head of the Aliyah Bet, the organ 
that had been in charge of clandestine immigration to Palestine. As early as 
1952, Nativ’s objective was to « ingather the exiles » from the Soviet Union. The 
choice of the recruits was another link between the two organs. Avigur was 
determined to surround himself only with Zionists close to Mapaï
2
 and, 
preferably, with kibboutzniks known for their idealism, their experience abroad 
and their discretion. Though secular, Nativ’s emissaries nevertheless had to be 
familiar with Jewish traditions and religion. Avigur also selected olim
3
 who had 
come from Eastern Europe or from neighbouring countries of the Soviet Union 
for their knowledge of Yiddish, Russian, and other Slavic languages
4
. In contrast 
with emissaries who had worked for the Aliyah Bet, those of Nativ sent behind 
the Iron Curtain were protected by diplomatic status which guarantied their 
immunity and facilitated their access to the highest levels of the government of 
the country they were serving in. The liaison office chose respectability as its 
frame of action. The principles destined to guide it were defined as the 
following: the Soviet regime should not be attacked in any way, Nativ’s action 
should remain distinct from Cold War antagonism and its methods should avoid 
endangering Soviet Jews at all costs. Its emissaries complied with these 
principles until diplomatic relations broke in 1967, putting an end to all types of 
operations, clandestine included. Until then, under their diplomatic cover, the 
men posted in Moscow were assigned the task of maintaining a constant link 
with Jews they met, of helping them, and, most importantly, of providing them 
with information on Israel and religious objects so as to encourage their 
identification with the Hebrew State. The mission of the emissaries posted in the 
Eastern democracies was more ambitious. Emigration, as long as it was payed 
for, was indeed tolerated. But the very limited results and the unlikelihood of 
success, which in the best case would be obtained only in the very long term, 
enticed Avigur to expand Nativ’s action to the rest of the world as early as 1955
5
. 
                                                
2
 Palestine Workers’ Party, created in 1930 under the aegis of Ben Gourion. 
3
 « Immigrants » in Hebrew. 
4
 « Conspiracy of silence », Kol Ha’ir Yerushalayim, 20 November 1992. 
5
 Interview with Nechemia Levanon, 24 October 2002, Kfar Blum, Israel. On Nativ’s first 
years of activity, Levanon, Nechemia, ha-Kod Nativ, Tel-Aviv, Am Oved Publishers Ltd, 
1995, chapters 1 to 7. 
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His idea was to launch a campaign in the West, called “Bar”, in order to 
sensitize international public opinion to the plight of Soviet Jews, so as to 
provoke from the outside what seemed impossible to obtain from the inside. 
Once more, this strategic choice was made in a specific international context. 
Starting in 1955, the Hebrew State recognized the pro-Arabic turn of the 
Kremlin : criticizing Moscow’s disrespect of emigration rights was not as costly 
as before. Also, at a time when Khrushchev’s new government attempted a 
rapprochement with the West, initiating “Bar” was fully justified due to the 
Soviets’ new sensitivity to their image in non-Communist countries. The new 
criticism of Moscow in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Budapest in 1956, and 
the condamnation of the Stalinist regime during the XXth Congress of the Soviet 
Communist Party were opportunities Nativ did not want to neglect. 
Distinguishing Nativ’s campaign from an anti-Soviet attack remained, however, 
an imperative for its leaders, for Israel still refused to take the risk of being held 
responsible for increased East/West tensions, though everything was done to 
conceal the Hebrew State’s role as initiator and organizer of the campaign
6
.  
Still deeply shocked by the Shoah, Europe appeared as the best ally to help 
Soviet Jews. Wishing to have an international impact, however, Nativ enlarged 
its field of action to countries of major Jewish immigration, whether old or new, 
such as Australia, New Zealand, Latin America, Canada and the United States. 
To each of these countries, Nativ sent emissaries posted in Israeli embassies or 
consulates. Most of them matched the profile defined by Avigur during the first 
years –old stock Zionists who generally knew the Soviet Union. The rest were 
members of the new Israeli elite that had made aliyah during or after the War. 
The mission of each of them was to implement an identical scheme of 
intervention designed in Tel-Aviv, though local adaptations were allowed. 
Everywhere, Jewish communities were to be the main allies. But since these 
communities were initially reluctant to get involved, Avigur and his second in 
command, Benyamin Eliav, decided that intellectuals and politicians would be 
the primary targets of the liaison office. Not having local Jewish communities in 
the front line contributed to maintaining the doubt about the real origin of the 
campaign
7
. The greatest originality of this campaign was to look for support 
among liberals and, in Europe, also among communist sympathizers. These 
personalities’ condamnation of the Kremlin was likely to be extremely disturbing 
for the Soviet Union and very impressive to the international public opinion. 
                                                
6
 Govrin, Yaacov, Israeli-Soviet Relations 1953-1967, Portland, Oregon, Frank Cass, 
1998, pp. 181-182. 
7
 Levanon, Nechemia, « Israel’s role in the campaign », in  Friedman, Murray, Chernin 
Albert D. (ed.), A Second Exodus. The American Movement to Free Soviet Jews, New 
England, Brandeis University Press, 1995, p. 73. 
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Thus, the Hebrew State could conduct its campaign fully under cover and 
prevent the plight of Soviet Jews from being a religious and partisan issue. 
It was not until 1958 that Avigur started considering the United States as the 
best place for his emissaries. In the event that it was possible to influence the 
Soviet Union, Washington was the only power able to do so. The United States 
was also very promising because it possessed a pluralist and open political 
system, and a system on which the American Jewish community –the most 
numerous, the most powerful and the most anxious to put an end to its 
association with Communism and to compensate for its inaction during World 
War II– was likely to have an influence. From 1958 to the end of the 1980s, the 
Israeli office sent its best emissaries to America, men with the finest knowledge 
of Communist countries and masters in tactics of influence. Their ideological and 
professional trajectory reveal Nativ’s expectations regarding “Bar” in the United 
States
8
.  
The first Israeli to be sent to New York by Nativ in 1958, Uri Ra’anan, 
operated with great independance from Tel-Aviv’s office, but he did not have the 
power of his successors. Born in Austria before finding refuge in England during 
the War, he had no direct experience of the Soviet regime. However, after his 
studies at Oxford, Ra’anan worked for the international division of the BBC and 
became, after his aliyah, editor of the international section of the Jerusalem Post 
and later of Ha’aretz. It was for his expertise on Communist countries gained in 
journalism, but also probably for his friendship with Moshe Sharett that he was 
selected to implement “Bar” in the United States. The exact nature of his 
assignment was far from clearly defined. Ra’anan decided to use this freedom to 
cultivate the press, a professional environment he knew well, to make the first 
contacts in the literary and artistic world, and to recruit a small number of 
American Jews to plant the first seeds of the mobilization of the Jewish 
organized community. Nativ’s action gained professionalism with the arrival of 
Benyamin Eliav in 1960, about whom little is known. The appointment of this 
former emissary to Moscow and Latin America, and foremost thinker of the 
liaison office, symbolized Nativ’s will for increasing sophistication of the Israeli 
action in the United States. As Consul General, Eliav had little time to devote to 
Soviet Jews after his regular business was finished. It was he, however, who 
defined the first goal of the Israeli action in the United States: to convince 
progressive Americans to put pressure on the Kremlin in order to obtain the 
                                                
8
 Unfortunately, we possess very little information on Benyamin Eliav and Yitzchak 
Rager. The bibliography, which is focused on Levanon, ignores their actions, which was 
most likely more important than these paragraphs suggest. 
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respect of their rights
9
. In 1961, both men left New York, Ra’anan to enter the 
diplomatic service, Eliav to pursue his work for Nativ in London.  
Meir Rosenne suceeded them. This future Israeli ambassador to Paris and 
Washington fulfilled all the criteria defined by Shaul Avigur. Born in Romania 
in 1931, Rosenne grew up in a francophile, cultivated and Zionist family closely 
linked to Palestine. In 1944, he made aliyah with the rest of his family and, a few 
years later, demonstrated his attachment to his new country by enrolling in the 
Haganah
10
. Once the State of Israel was created, Rosenne swore to serve it by 
becoming one of its diplomats. He learnt this profession in Paris, at the Institut 
d’Etudes Politiques, where he made many contacts that would be very precious 
once he worked for Nativ. He stayed in Paris for seven years, long enough to 
finish his dissertation at the Sorbonne. Seduced by this young man with strong 
Zionist convictions, well introduced in the Parisian intellectual and political 
world, Eliav persuaded Rosenne to differ his entry into the diplomatic carreer to 
work for Nativ. Attracted by the Lishkat’s visionary goal, Rosenne organized a 
campaign to sensitize the French to the plight of Soviet Jews, before moving to 
New York where his actions were targetted to the United Nations and to relations 
with American and Canadian Jewish organizations
11
.  
This mandate partially overlapped that of Nechemia Levanon’s who arrived in 
the United States in 1965 to serve in Washington. It was from this time that 
dated the bipolar representation of Nativ in America. When he settled his 
headquarters in the federal capital, Levanon had already done a lot for the 
Lishkat, not only in the Soviet Union where he had been its first emissary, but 
also in Tel-Aviv where he had actively participated in the conception of “Bar.” 
For Avigur, he was the ideal recruit. Born in 1915 in Latvia to a father who was 
a member of a clandestine Jewish group, Levanon was from very early on 
exposed to the risk of underground activities. He had also demonstrated many 
times his attachment to Zionism. Noticed at a young age for his organizing skills, 
his power of persuasion and his humour, he was recruited by one of the Latvian 
heads of the “Netzah,” a Zionist youth movement influenced by socialism, to 
collaborate in the creation of one of its branches in Estonia. Later, Levanon 
supervised the preparation of young Zionists to aliyah. In 1938, he and his 
“halutzim
12
” abandoned a Europe threatened by Nazism for Palestine, where they 
attempted to found a kibbutz in Northern Galilee. During all these endeavours, 
Levanon showed his ability as a leader –a skill that led once more to his selection 
                                                
9
 Interview with Yoram Dinstein, New York, 18 July 2003. 
10
 Jewish Clandestine Army created in 1920 in Palestine, integrated into the new secret 
services in 1951. 
11
 Interview with Meir Rosenne, Jerusalem, 17 October 2002. 
12
 « Pionneers » in Hebrew. 
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by the “Netzah” to be its emissary in England
13
. When Shaul Avigur asked 
Levanon to join Nativ in 1952, he hoped his command of several European 
languages, his direct knowledge of the Soviet Union, his experience of 
clandestinity and, more than anything else, his leadership talents would help the 
cause of Soviet Jewry. In 1965, when he arrived in Washington, Levanon was 
already one of Nativ’s pillars. After the demise of its founder in 1970, he took 
over the leadership and, as its director, came back to the United States during the 
following decade every time a sentitive political choice had to be made. 
While Levanon operated in Washington, a young diplomat arrived in New 
York to suceed Meir Rosenne. Like his predecessor, Yoram Dinstein had been 
convinced by Eliav to interrupt his diplomatic career to serve Nativ. A brilliant 
lawyer, familiar with the intricacies of international and American law after a 
year at New York University and a semi-official membership in the Israeli 
delegation to the United Nations, this dedicated Zionist did not hesitate to take 
the risk to sacrify a career which some foresaw as extremely promising –Golda 
Meir herself had noticed two reports he had sent from New York, one dealing 
with the incoherence of Israeli discourse on Palestinian refugees at the UN, the 
other dwelling on the necessity to condemn the Soviet Union for its violation of 
the human rights of Jews in international organizations. Impressed by Eliav, 
Dinstein accepted to implement with the greatest loyalty the directives decided 
upon in Tel-Aviv. He earned a reputation for dogmatism which might have 
hindered him from fulfilling his objectives, though his work was greatly 
facilitated by the aura the Hebrew State gained during the Six Day-War
14
. 
Yehoshua Pratt, who followed Dinstein, had a very similar profile to that of 
Levanon, but he had neither Levanon’s charism, nor his psychological stability. 
Born in 1915 in Warsaw, he belonged to the same generation and was bred by 
the same political culture as Levanon. Raised in a socialist Zionist family, he was 
a member of a group which prepared young Jews to aliyah. In the wake of World 
War II, he became one of the organizers of a clandestine group whose aim was to 
help Jews residing next to the Polish border to flee the Soviet Union. Once the 
action of this group was discovered, Pratt was tortured in Soviet jails. Helped by 
a KGB officer, he succeeded in escaping and crossing the border to Poland from 
where he emigrated to Israel. There, he served in the army and studied law at the 
university before working as a legal counselor for the Histadruth
15
. As Rosenne 
and Dinstein before him, Pratt abandoned his career to answer the call of Avigur, 
in whom he saw his mentor. He was set apart from others by very precious 
                                                
13
 Levanon, Nechemia, The Road to the Banks of the Jordan, Kibbutz Ein Dor, Israel, 
« HaMadpis », 2002, and interview with Nechemia Levanon. 
14
 Interview with Yoram Dinstein. 
15
 Israeli Federation of Labor created in1920. 
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qualities: he had already experienced the methods of the KGB, possessed a high 
level of education, and, though he was an Atheist, had a very good knowledge of 
Judaism. For all these reasons, Avigur sent him to Moscow from 1959 to 1962, 
and later to Warsaw. He also worked for Nativ’s central office before being 
posted in New York in 1970 where his friendliness contrasted with Dinstein’s 
inflexibility
16
.  
The circumstances that led to the appointment of the last emissary (of the 
period studied) to work for Nativ remain unknown to us. The fact that Yitzhack 
Rager was born to a Russian mother as well as his experience in journalism 
surely played a role in the decision to recruit him. As a young reporter for the 
European office of Israeli broadcasting, Rager was noticed by Avigur during a 
trip he made to the Soviet Union to cover de Gaulle’s official visit, during which 
he met with Soviet Jews
17
. He was sent first to London and in 1973 to New York 
where, taken over by Levanon, he played only a minor role in an oversensitive 
American and international context that required the intervention of the Office’s 
head himself.  
The task of these emissaries, selected for their Zionism and their power of 
conviction, was to implement in the United States a strategy designed by the 
direction of Nativ in Tel-Aviv. As in all the other countries to which the Lishkat 
had sent its men, the Israelis sought to sensitize three types of groups: 
intellectuals, politicians and Jewish organizations –which were “Bar”’s veritable 
targets and were given the greatest attention by Nativ emissaries. 
An important part of Ra’anan and Eliav’s work consisted of approaching 
journalists and progressive intellectuals. They provided newsmen with 
information about the Soviet Union, a rare material at that time, with the hope of 
inspiring confidence and enticing them to publish articles on Soviet Jews. They 
were less careful when it came to sensitizing intellectuals to the cruelty of the 
Soviet Jews’ plight and persuading them to publicly condemn Moscow’s 
discriminatory treatment of its Jewish nationals. In New York, as well as in 
London, Paris, or Buenos-Aires, Nativ also secured the assistance of Jewish 
intellectuals whose roles were to trigger influential progressive figures’ 
sympathy for the cause. Ra’anan and Eliav obtained the support of Moshe 
Decter, a journalist well introduced in progressive circles and, most importantly, 
an anti-Communist. Son of an orthodox rabbi, Decter moved toward the Socialist 
Party and Americans for Democratic Action after his studies at the Jewish 
Theological Seminary and his PhD in social science at the New School. He was 
also close to Elliot Cohen’s Commentary at a time when the magazine 
                                                
16
 Interview with Yehoshua Pratt, Tel-Aviv, 25 October 2002. 
17
 Interview with Yitzhack Rager, 1989, « Soviet Jewry movement in America », New 
York Public Library and American Jewish Committee Oral History Collection. 
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distinguished itself for its systematic opposition to the Soviet Union. Decter was 
the editor of the New Leader, a low-circulation magazine associated with the 
American Labour Conference on International Affairs, a liberal anti-Communist 
organization. During the first two years of his association with Nativ, Decter kept 
his editorial job and worked as a volunteer for Eliav who gave him information 
that provided the core of the notes he handed out to his journalist or academic 
friends, and that inspired his articles on Soviet Jews, such as that published in 
Foreign Affairs with quite some success in January 1963. In the meanwhile, co-
operation with the Israelis had deepened. In 1960, with the help of Ra’anan, 
Decter created an institutional cover for his activity, the Jewish Minority 
Research. To pay for his services, a financial set-up was designed by Nativ –
paying Decter directly would have made him an Israeli agent–: Nahum 
Goldmann, the president of the World Jewish Congress, accepted to contribute 
25 000 dollars yearly to the American Jewish Congres which, in turn, contributed 
the sum to the Jewish Minority Research whose office it housed in its 
headquarters
18
. 
During the following fifteen years, Decter, as director of this organization that 
was nothing but a cover, enrolled intellectuals and public figures as spokesmen 
for the movement to help Soviet Jews. His recruits –researchers, writers, 
Supreme Court Justices, union and Black leaders, clergymen– were very high-
level personalities, often engaged in other combats –such as the Civil Rights or 
the pacifist movements–, and whose respectability enhanced the legitimacy of 
the cause of Soviet Jewry. Decter convinced most of them to participate in 
conferences he was organizing to popularize the plight of Soviet Jews among the 
American public. He also initiated a correspondence on the treatment of Jews by 
the Kremlin between Eleanor Roosevelt, Justices William Douglas and Thurgood 
Marshall, and theologian Rheinold Niebuhr on the one hand, and Khrushchev on 
the other hand. In Great-Britain, Nativ had similarly triggered a widely 
publicized letter exchange between Lord Bertrand Russell and the General 
Secretary of the Communist Soviet Party. Until 1975, though fearful that his 
association with Nativ might be discovered, Decter accepted to play the role of 
ghost-writer and shadow-organizer. Starting in 1969, he was helped by William 
Korey, another recruit of Nativ, co-founder of the Academic Committee on 
Soviet Jewry, an organization created to accelerate the mobilization of the 
academic world at the instingation of Levanon
19
. However, in the late 1960s, the 
participation of intellectuals in the campaign became secondary
20
. The beginning 
                                                
18
 Interview with Moshe Decter, 1989, « Soviet Jewry movement in America », New 
York Public Library and American Jewish Committee Oral History Collection. 
19
 Interview with Bill Korey, New York, 7 May 2002. 
20
 Decter, Moshe, « Crisis in the Soviet Jewry Movement », Moment, April 1976, p. 38. 
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of Soviet Jewry activism in the wake of the Six Day-War and the show trials 
orchestrated by Moscow functioned as crucial accelerating factors for the 
mobilization. No American with even the slightest interest in politics could any 
longer ignore the existence of discrimination against Soviet Jews, and the 
interdiction to emigrate from which they suffered. For Nativ, it was time to move 
from information to action. To fulfill this task, politicians and Jewish 
organizations were the best allies. 
In order to increase efficiency, starting in 1965, the workload was divided 
between the emissary based in Washington, the political capital, and the 
emissary working in New York, the center of American Jewish life and the 
headquarters of the United Nations. However, until Levanon’s arrival, Rosenne, 
in New York, was in charge of creating political alliances and approaching 
Congressmen, the Congress being the lever on which Nativ could hope to have 
the greatest influence. It is indeed always easier to make friends among those 
who are accountable to their constituency, than among bureaucrats or career 
diplomats, more conservative and naturally less sensitive to the pressure of 
public opinion. Rosenne secured allies among Jewish politicians who would 
remain loyal to the cause until the end of the 1970s –Senators Abraham Ribicoff 
(Democrat of Connecticut) and Jacob Javits (Republican of New York), and 
Congressmen Seymour Halpern and Leonard Farbstein, both Democrats of New 
York. He also won to his camp Congressmen with an important Jewish 
constituency, as well as loyal friends of Israel, such as Senator Henry Jackson, 
Democrat of Washington. Once their awareness to the plight of Soviet Jews had 
been raised through pertinent information produced by Nativ in Tel-Aviv, they 
were easily convinced to insert documents relating to them in the Congressional 
Record
21
, to voice in Congress their attachment to the respect of Soviet Jews’ 
right to emigrate, and to introduce, as early as 1963, resolutions condemning 
Soviet antisemitism, the closing of places of Jewish worship and the banning of 
matzoh-baking. The Kennedy administration was also approached by Nativ’s 
best political allies, Javits, Ribicoff, and Justice Arthur Goldberg who was 
Jewish as well. Despite the State Department’s refusal to intervene in Soviet 
internal policy –in the wake of Cuba’s missile crisis, Soviet Jews were barely a 
priority– Kennedy’s sensitivity gave hope that dissipated immediately after his 
assassination
22
.  
                                                
21
 The Congressional Record is a daily verbatim transcript of all speeches made by 
Senators and Representatives in Congress. It also includes bills, resolutions and motions, 
as well as texts proposed for insertion by Congressmen. 
22
 See Ro’i, Yaacov, The Struggle for Soviet Jewish Emigration, 1948-1967, New York, 
Cambridge University Press, 1991; and Weinstein, Lewis H., « Soviet Jewry and the 
American Jewish Community 1963-1987 », American Jewish History, vol. 77, June 16, 
1988, pp. 600-605. 
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Nativ’s political action gained a new scope with Levanon’s arrival in 
Washington. Appointed number three in the embassy, he cultivated the 
Congressional contacts of his predecessors and created new ones among recently 
elected Congressmen, such as Robert Kennedy in New York whom he helped 
prepare a trip to the Soviet Union. However, with the appeasement brought on by 
new leadership at the Kremlin, the amount of legislation dealing with Soviet 
anti-Semitism diminished. Levanon therefore concentrated his action on the 
administration, and, more precisely, on the State Department where he was well 
received by the contacts of Israel’s ambassador, Abraham Harman. He 
introduced himself as the Israeli specialist of the Soviet Union, with an expertise 
gained during a unique experience behind the Iron Curtain –which no other 
Sovietologist had–, expanded by a daily reading of the Soviet press. Levanon 
was therefore a highly informed man, an extremely interesting contact for 
American diplomats always looking for news. On a regular basis, he met the men 
of the State Department who were in charge of the Soviet Bureau –Malcolm 
Toon, later to be American ambassador to Moscow, Helmut Sonnenfeldt
23
, future 
counselor of Henry Kissinger, or Walter Stoessel, Deputy-Assistant Secretary for 
Eastern Europe–, and those in charge of intelligence on the Soviet Union
24
. He 
shared with them precious information on the Soviet internal situation that only 
the Israelis possessed, thanks to the exclusive source they had in the persons of 
Soviet Jews debriefed upon their arrival in Tel-Aviv. It is likely that this 
informal communication of intelligence at the initiative of Israelis encouraged 
the Americans to ignore the activities of Nativ’s emissaries in the United States. 
In any case, this information-sharing allowed the Israelis to discreetly pass on 
information relating to the situation of Soviet Jews to the State Department, and 
thus to strengthen from inside the effect of the mobilization on their behalf 
taking place in the Congress and in society
25
. Through Levanon, the 
Administration had without any doubt become aware of the violation of cultural 
and religious rights of Soviet Jews, and the ban on emigration from which they 
suffered. Yet, his action enticed neither the Johnson administration, though 
senstive to their cause, nor the Nixon administration, much less so, to make any 
move to help them. No matter the President, until 1971, the plight of Soviet Jews 
remained a minor issue on the agenda of Soviet-American relations, on which 
were such burning questions as the Vietnam war, the resolution of the Middle 
East conflit, and, at the end of the 1960s, a détente that required, according to 
                                                
23
 The occurrence of these meetings was confirmed by Helmut Sonnenfeldt himself 
(interview, Washington, 11 June, 2003). He also stated that he was fully aware of the 
nature of Levanon’s activities in the United States. 
24
 Levanon, Nechemia, ha-Kod Nativ, Tel-Aviv, Am Oved Publishers Ltd, 1995, p. 202.  
25
 Interviews with Yoram Dinstein (New York, 18 July, 2003), and Baruch Gur (Tel-
Aviv, 21 October, 2002). 
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Nixon, silence on all polemical issues that could antagonize the Soviet Union. To 
all demands of intervention on behalf of Soviet Jews, the successive 
administrations answered by a shrug and passed the responsibility on to NGOs. It 
was only in 1972 that the action initiated much earlier on by Nativ’s emissaries 
started producing an effect on the American political scene. This success, on 
which we will dwell later, was made possible by the mobilization of the 
organized Jewish community that created, with the help of the Israeli emissaries 
based in New York, the necessary means to have leverage on American foreign 
policy. 
Paradoxically, obtaining the mobilization of American Jewish organizations 
was not an easy task for Nativ. Some grassroots organizations
26
 were created 
spontaneously and independently from the Israelis with the objective to help 
Soviet Jews –the Student Struggle for Soviet Jews in New York and the 
Cleveland Council on Soviet Anti-Semitism in Ohio. For the Lishkat, it was a 
first step toward an effective mobilization of the community. For this reason, 
Meir Rosenne and Nechemia Levanon decided to encourage them and to find 
American funds to help them carry out their activities, before opposing them for 
their radicalism at the end of the 1960s
27
. What the Israelis really sought was the 
involvement of the American Jewish establishment
28
 and of the most influential 
Jewish leaders, which should lead, according to them, to the creation of an 
organization fully devoted to the Soviet Jewish issue. This creation would show 
the importance the establishment gave to this new issue confronting the Jewish 
world, and would allow the participation of organizations that were not Zionist 
or not members of the establishment umbrella-organisations. Meir Rosenne and 
Nativ’s leadership had a hard time convincing Jewish organizations to unite their 
strengths for this cause. They were resisted by pure inertia and by endless 
discussions on the responsibilites which this new organization should have. The 
very influential Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations already 
considered the new scheme a threat to its power. Added to these fears in a Jewish 
community that was already deeply divided, were ideoligical oppositions, 
underestimated by the Israelis, which were beginning to resound. A most 
extreme version came from the World Jewish Congress and its president, Nahum 
Goldman, who opposed the goal of triggering Soviet Jews’ emigration on the 
grounds that Jewish life should be maintained in the Soviet Union. The other 
organizations resisted because they refused to take orders from the Israelis. For 
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American Jewish leaders, the relationship between Israel and American Jewish 
organizations had to comply with the Blaustein/Ben-Gurion Pact of 1950, in 
which the Israeli Prime Minister had officially renounced Israel’s entitlement to 
speak on behalf of world Jewry and had accepted the principal of non-
interference in the American Jewish community’s affairs
29
. Though discreet and, 
in general, subtle, Nativ’s intervention was a major violation of this Pact. 
However, an ad hoc conference, named the American Jewish Conference on 
Soviet Jewry, was finaly born in April 1964, after numerous Israeli intercessions 
behind the scenes. With a ridiculously low budget and a revolving leadership 
shared among member-organizations, this conference could have but little 
weight. Besides the constitutive weakness adopted to keep opposition quiet, 
another feature of this young organization was disappointing to the Israelis: they 
were unable to persuade its leadership to make as its first priority the reunion of 
families that would bring Soviet Jews to Israel. In the Conference’s founding 
declaration, Jewish establishment leaders defined the defense of cultural and 
religious rights as the main objective of their action, despite Nativ’s advice. The 
Israelis portrayed the struggle for emigration as the goal to accomplish: 
according to them, it implied no intervention in Soviet affairs and treated the 
Soviet Union like any other country from whom was demanded the recognition 
of the Jews’ right to go back to their “historical homeland”. For the Israelis, the 
real advantage of emigration to the respect of minority rights was, first and 
foremost, to enable them to reach their real objective: provoke the aliyah of 
Soviet Jews. On the other hand, American Jewish organizations claimed that it 
was easier to obtain concessions on rights that the Soviets granted to other 
minorities than to demand emigration that was not granted to any Soviet citizen –
for that would have implied demanding exceptional treatment for Soviet Jews. 
Behind this argument, one should read the refusal of American Jews to take the 
risk of being accused of dual loyalty by playing too obviously the Israeli game. 
One should also decipher the higher priority they gave to the survival of Soviet 
Judaism to the fulfillment of the Zionist ideal. However, this firm resistance to 
the Israeli emissaries vanished in the euphoria created by the Israeli victory 
amidst the Six Day-War, which put an end to the American Jewish community’s 
opposition to Zionism. 
Nativ progressively succeeded in imposing its strategy and its men. During the 
first years of the AJCSJ, non-Jewish personalities who had been approached by 
the Israeli office during the early 1960s became honorary members of the new 
organization. Many politicians enrolled by the Israeli emissaries or by Moshe 
Decter appeared regularly at demonstrations coordinated by the new 
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organization. Nativ also encouraged the collaboration between the AJCSJ and its 
political friends in Congress so as to politicize the Soviet Jewish issue. The 
Lishkat emissaries never gave precise orders. But, attending most of the AJCSJ 
meetings and counting on the help of a few devoted Jewish leaders –Jerry 
Goodman of the American Jewish Committee, William Korey of B’nai B’rith, or 
Phil Baum of the American Jewish Congress–, they were sure to communicate 
information favoring the Israeli objectives and to try to convince the American 
Jewish organizations to achieve them. Nativ’s emissaries and leadership 
intervened directly only in cases of serious divisions between establishment 
organizations, for example à propos the nature of public demonstrations, or for 
major international events –such as the Leningrad trials
30
 or, later, the adoption 
of the emigration tax by the Soviets
31
– which required a coordinated response 
between Israel and the American diaspora organizations. As time passed and as 
the aura of the Hebrew State increased in the American Jewish community, the 
Israeli intervention in community affairs was better accepted. Yoram Dinstein 
and Yehoshua Pratt took advantage of this new situation to obtain, in 1971, the 
transformation of the AJCSJ into a permanent conference, the National 
Conference on Soviet Jewry (NCSJ), possessing a decent budget and a 
permanent staff headed by a faithful friend of Nativ, Jerry Goodman
32
. The 
slogan chosen by the NCSJ, “Let my people go !”, an obvious quote from the 
Book of Exodus, left no doubt as to the goal of this new organization. Another 
cause of satisfaction for Nativ was the decisive role played by the NCSJ at the 
International Conference on Soviet Jews which took place in Brussels in 1971 
and was organized by the Israelis together with many other diaspora 
organizations, during which the Zionist dimension of the movement appeared 
strikingly. The Israelis seemed to have had finally reached their goal vis-à-vis the 
American Jewish community. 
Without any doubt, the action of Nativ’s emissaries contributed to putting the 
Soviet Jewish issue on the agenda of American foreign policy, though the 
increasing role of the grassroots organizations should not be neglected. The 
Israelis played a role in the birth and the popularization of this cause in the press, 
among progressive political circles and in the Jewish establishment, years before 
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anything had been heard about Soviet dissidents in the U.S. However, starting in 
1972, once the necessary context to the success of the agenda-setting was made, 
the Israeli emissaries retreated temporarily to make way to Americans: 
Congressmen and Jewish leaders. The latter became the main actors of the 
movement to help Soviet Jews at a time when Moscow seemed to realize that 
opening its borders could be rewarding to its relations with Washingon, and at a 
time when sensitive events took place that were particularly favourable to a 
maximum politization of the cause: the first Nixon-Brezhnev summit held in 
Moscow in May 1972, the still unexplained adoption of the education tax that hit 
Soviet Jews in August, and the coming American presidential elections the 
following November. In this second phase, a fully political one, Israelis 
intervened only to help the establishment organizations play their new role, and 
to lift doubts and hesitations.  
Since the Leningrad trials, the Jewish establishment, as well as grassroots 
organizations, had multiplied their demands for an intervention on behalf of 
Soviet Jews at all levels of political responsibility –municipal, state, 
congressional and executive. With the help of their long time allies, they were 
sufficiently vocal so that the plight of Soviet Jews was mentioned every time 
Soviet-American relations were discussed, and so that the White House finally 
considered raising the issue with its counterparts at the Kremlin. Resolutions had 
also been introduced in both congressional houses to put pressure on Moscow, 
but none of them had been adopted. At the end of September 1972, a great 
opportunity for the movement appeared: Henry Jackson, a fierce opponent of 
Nixon’s and Kissinger’s détente, decided, at the instigation of his legislative 
assistant Richard Perle, to engage in the fight for Soviet Jewry’s emigration 
rights. He introduced an amendment to a trade law linking the extension of 
economic privileges –most favored nation and credit guarantees– for a non-
market economy to its respect of minority emigration rights. Though Levanon 
insisted that he was responsible for Perle’s conversion to Zionism
33
, Nativ played 
no role in the phrasing of the amendment; it is more toward the grassroots 
organizations that one should look to find its origin. But Levanon, as director of 
the Lishkat ha-Kesher, intervened personally to persuade the few Jewish leaders 
close to Nixon who were hesitating to back Jackson’s legislative initiative. From 
October 1972 to the adoption of the amendment in December 1974, the 
establishment and grassroots organizations acted fully independently as real 
lobbies, submitting to Jackson and his staff all the information on Soviet Jews 
they needed, playing the role of intermediaries between Soviet Jewish activists 
and the U.S. Congress, using well-planned techniques to convince those 
Congressmen whose vote was decisive to co-sponsor the amendment, and 
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coordinating massive letter-writing campaigns when the text was being voted on 
by the two houses. 
However, the Jackson-Vanik amendment did not owe its success only to the 
mobilization of American Jewish organizations. It also was supported by a very 
large bi-partisan coalition uniting Human Rights defenders, anti-Communists, 
détente opponents, and protectionnists hostile to trade with the Soviet Union. As 
well, the Jewish establishment was at times painfully shaky, as reported 
extensively by the press. Three times during 1973, the Jewish leaders closest to 
the White House were pressured by Nixon to withdraw their support to the 
amendment. They were torn between their gratefulness for his supportive policy 
to Israel –Nixon had rejected the Rogers Plan
34
 and increased to as of yet 
unattained levels the financial and military help toward Israel– and their loyalty 
to Soviet Jews. The most delicate moment occured when, in the middle of the 
Yom Kippur War, precisely at the time when Israel so badly needed American 
help, Nixon tried to convince Golda Meir that she persuade American Jewish 
organizations to stop supporting Jackson. Nechemia Levanon, for whom such an 
act would have discredited the Jewish establishment on the American political 
scene, intervened once more. To make his point, he first had to oppose the Israeli 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Israeli ambassador in Washington, Simcha 
Dinitz, who were ready to sacrifice the hope of help to Soviet Jews with 
uncertain effects, to a military and financial assistance to Israel, which was not 
sure to be linked to the the abandonment of the Jackson-Vanik amendment. In 
the end, Levanon was authorized to impress upon Jewish leaders the necessity of 
remaining at Jackson’s side
35
. This success is an excellent illustration of the trust 
shown to Levanon and his office by the Prime Minister, and of the importance 
that was given to “Bar” by the Israeli state. But it is likely that the intervention of 
Nativ’s director was not as decisive as he would have liked to think. A retreat of 
the establishment would have been impossible within the context of the extreme 
mobilization of so many local Jewish organizations, unless it had been ready to 
accept a schism with its support base. Until December 1974, the Jewish 
organizations increased their support of the coalition backing the amendment 
without Nativ needing to intervene again. Its adoption was considered more a 
decisive turn in American foreign policy –it provoked the demise of détente and 
implied the success of humanitarian concerns of the Congress over the realism of 
the Executive–, than a victory for American Jewish organizations. In January 
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1975, refusing to give in to the pressure of the Congress, the Soviets decided to 
impose a new limit on Jewish emigration, which had reached the level of 35,000 
in 1973, and to renounce the economic advantages the American Executive was 
willing to extend to them, in order to avoid the conditions the Jackson-Vanik 
amendment had imposed on them. 
In about fifteen years, the undercover activities of Nativ’s emissaries created 
the context and the conditions that were necessary to shape foreign policy to help 
Soviet Jews. The men of the Lishkat ha-Kesher pulled the strings that led to the 
condemnation of Moscow for its discriminatory treatment of Soviet Jews and to 
the implementation of leverage against the Soviet Union. With the adoption of 
the Jackson-Vanik amendment by the Congress in 1974, a chapter of the 
American movement to aid Soviet Jews as well as a decisive stage of Nativ’s 
action in the U.S came to an end. The objective that Washington put pressure on 
the Kremlin had been reached, though the outcome was not quite what had been 
hoped for in the early 1950s. Israelis would have to wait another fifteen years for 
the doors of the Soviet citadel to open completely. Until then, Nativ’s activity in 
New York and Washington went on in conditions that were very different from 
the improvision that had characterized its beginnings : the influence of the Israeli 
office became much more visible as it became more institutionalized. Another 
decisive change was due to the violent fight that, starting in 1974, opposed Israel 
and the American Jewish organizations as to Soviet Jews’ country of 
immigration –whether Israel or the United States–, in other words as to the 
Zionist vs. non-Zionist nature of the movement. This new quarrel was the 
beginning of a new period in the relationships between the Lishkat ha-Kesher 
and Jewish American organizations. 
To this day, Nativ’s activity in the United States remains shrouded in mystery. 
Most former emissaries have accepted to speak about their past experiences. But 
Americans who worked more or less closely with the Israeli office have chosen 
to remain silent –some negating the very existence of such a collaboration, others 
protecting themselves behind an alleged clause of secrecy that would have been 
imposed on them by Israel. Their attitude contributes to creating suspicion about 
the real nature of Nativ’s action in the United States. However, the Lishkat ha-
Kesher seems to have been careful to remain within the borders of legality, 
paying no one but its own emissaries, counting only on the power of its cause to 
convince and on the loyalty of the American Jewish organizations for Israel’s 
well-being. The declassification of Nativ’s archives will certainly shed a clear 
light on the exact nature of “Bar” in the United States. For the time being, 
interwiews reveal the deep concern of Israelis to abide by American law, a 
concern they had to reconcile with a well-known predilection for secret 
operations and an attitude totally devoid of scruples faced with influencing the 
Diaspora. 
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